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ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN CONTROLING THE EXERCISE OF
POLICE AUTHORITY
HERMAN GOLDSTEIN
The author is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice Administration at the University of Wisconsin
Law School. He is currently engaged in a program of research and training in law enforcement under
a grant from the Ford Foundation.
Mr. Goldstein served from 1960 to 1964 as Executive Assistant to the Superintendent of Police
in Chicago. Previously, as a Research Associate with the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the
Administration of Criminal Justice, he studied police operations in Michigan and Wisconsin.
Upon his graduation from the University of Connecticut, Mr. Goldstein embarked upon graduate
studies in governmental administration at the University of Pennsylvania, where he received his
Master's degree.
In this article, Mr. Goldstein draws upon his personal experience as an observer of police operations,
and as an administrator in a large police agency, to examine some of the complex problems en-
countered in exerting control over police conduct. As a basis for his analysis, the author distinguishes
the several forms of most commonly cited misconduct, noting the quite different problems which each
presents. Often-ignored factors inherent in the nature of the police function that complicate review
and control of police actions are described. Considering the effect which this range of problems and
factors has in limiting the value of existing and proposed methods for exerting control from outside the
police agency, the author concludes that improved control over police conduct is primarily dependent
upon the willingness of a police administrator to exert tighter and more effective controls over his
personnel.
Among the most significant trends in the law
enforcement field during the past decade has been
the increase in efforts to subject the exercise of
police authority to review and control from outside
the police agency.
For most of this period, attention has been
primarily focused upon the effect of the "exclu-
sionary rule", whereby evidence obtained illegally
is not admissible in a criminal prosecution. Adop-
tion of the rule has placed all trial judges in the
position of reviewing and controlling police prac-
tices that bear upon the manner in which evidence
is acquired.i More recently, increased tensions
experienced in some communities in the relation-
ship between the police and local citizens have
focused attention upon proposals for the estab-
lishment of civilian review boards to air complaints
against police officers. Efforts on the part of the
police to reduce such tensions have given rise to
a third development-the establishment of new
programs to improve police community relation-
I See, in particular, LaFave & Remington, Controlling
the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing
Lau Enforcment Decisions, 63 MIc. L. Rav. 987
(1965), and Brennan, Judiia/Supervsion of Criminal
Law Administration, 9 Cscmr & DELINQUENCY 227
(1963).
ships in which a special effort is made by the police
to subject their operations to greater public view.
Each of these developments has been the subject
of widespread interest and discussion. Nation-
wide application of the exclusionary rule gave
rise to heated debates between law enforcement
officials and those who have defended judicial
review, but this argument has since been greatly
overshadowed by the controversy relating to
civilian review boards-a controversy that has
embroiled entire communities. The polarization
of views which has taken place and the involve-
ment of broader community issues have had the
unfortunate effect of beclouding the already com-
plex problems involved in the control of police
conduct.
Difficulties experienced in administering a police
agency have not been adequately explored, nor
has there been sufficient effort to assess the effec-
tiveness of the several forms of control that have
been advocated. Particularly bothersome is the
degree to which the taking of extreme positions for
purposes of argument has served to distort reality.
A necessary first step in this effort to examine
some of the underlying problems in the control of
police conduct is a restatement of several basic
propositions.
CONTROL OF POLICE BEHAVIOR
RESTORING A PROPER PERSPECTIVE
Control of official behavior under our system of
government is obviously a matter of legitimate
public interest. But the police-and especially
police organizations-have come to bristle at the
mere mention of "controls" and, in some quarters,
have gone so far as to disclaim the right or com-
petence of any external group to review police
conduct.2 Those who have taken this position ig-
nore the fact that the high value which our society
places on individual rights requires that there not
only be limitations on the authority exercised by
governmental agencies, but that there be effective
controls to assure that such power is not exceeded
or abused. The need for controls is especially acute
with regard to the police, for their authority-to
arrest, to detain, to search, and to use force-
is unique among governmental powers in the degree
to which it is disruptive of freedom, invasive of
privacy, and sudden and direct in its impact upon
the individual.
Secondly, it must be recognized that there has
been a demonstrated need for control. Police un-
derstandably are sensitive to having documenta-
tions of abuse in years past cited to support the
contention that the police of today are not to be
trusted. It is generally conceded that such prac-
tices as were described in the Wickersham Re-
ports of the 1930's, for example, no longer exist.3
But the total record of police misconduct, scattered
as it is, is too long and too recent to be ignored.
Beyond this, it seems apparent that the very
nature of the police function is likely to continue
to give rise to situations in which an individual
officer may misuse his police powers. Considering
these factors, it is not sufficient for the police to
continue to respond to demands for the establish-
ment of some form of controls, as has often been
done in recent years, by citing the absence of any
evidence of current abuse.
A third factor relates to the complexity of the
2The most vociferous objections to civilian review
boards may be found in the publications of the Fraternal
Order of Police. For the position of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, see = Pouce cnmE,
June 1965, pp. 8-9.2 National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforce-
ment, No. 11 (1931). The U.S. Supreme Court itself
acknowledged, in recently reviewing the record of police
abuse, that the examples which they cited were "un-
doubtedly the exception now", but the Court went on
to state that the examples are nevertheless sufficiently
widespread to be the object of concern. Miranda v
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
police task and the conditions under which the
police ordinarily function. Few citizens have a
basis for understanding the milieu in which a
police officer assigned to patrol duties operates,
unless their own work exposes them to the kinds
of problems confronted by the police. The officer
working in a congested section of a large city
rushes about the area to which he is assigned,
caring for one incident after another. His time
is spent dealing with a concentration of social
ills and with an infinite variety of situations re-
quiring some form of action. Incidents considered
as unusual occurrences by the average citizen
constitute the officer's routine work load.
Most of the people with whom an officer is
called upon to deal are in a highly emotional
state. A large percentage are intoxicated. Many
are abusive. And some are downright vicious. Speed
in the making of decisions is often essential in order
to avoid further harm to a victim, to safeguard
the officer, or to prevent some form of mob action.
Information required for the making of careful
decisions is not always readily available, nor is it
always possible to consult with superior officers
when guidance is needed.
It is not suggested, as some would contend, that
the existence of these and other similar conditions
makes it impossible for a person outside a police
agency to review police actions, or that the exist-
ence of such conditions serves to justify whatever
action may be taken. But it is suggested that dis-
cussions relating to the problems inherent in
controlling police behavior be undertaken with a
full awareness of the need for considering the com-
plex environment in which the police must usually
function.
The fourth and perhaps most important factor
lost sight of in the polarization of views that has
taken place is that primary dependence for the
control of police conduct must, under any condi-
tions, continue to be placed upon existing systems
of internal discipline. An agency functioning
outside a police department simply does not have
the capacity to substitute for the numerous
echelons of supervisory officers that are required
around the dock, twenty-four hours a day, to
provide the kind of on-the-spot direction and
control that is necessary to assure conformity by
hundreds and sometimes thousands of police
officers to established standards of conduct.
External controls are likely to be effective only
if they induce a desire and willingness on the part
1967]
HERMAN GOLDSTEIN
of police administrators and their supervisors to
elicit conformity from their subordinates. This
need makes it essential that increased attention
be devoted to the problems encountered by police
administrators in exerting internal controls; and
that consideration be given to the impact which
the several forms of external control have upon
internal discipline.
DISTINGUISHING AMiONG THE SEVERAL FoRMs OF
MISCONDUCT
Among the factors complicating the discussion
of control mechanisms has been a failure to identify
and separate out the several forms of behavior
that are of primary concern.
1. An Abuse of Police Authority in Dealing with
Citizens or a Breach of Intradepartmental Discipline?
Current public concern focuses primarily upon
police conduct which involves interaction between
a police officer and a citizen in contentious situa-
tions. The questioned actions often involve the
exercise of some form of police authority, such
as the holding of a person in physical custody,
the search of a person or of private premises, the
use of force, or the seizure of property. A sub-
stantial percentage of the complaints currently
coming in for special attention have alleged what
has come to be referred to as verbal abuse. Com-
plaints relating to such actions, which deprive a
citizen, in some measure, of his freedom, property,
privacy, or personal dignity, differ substantially
from those which allege (a) violations of regula-
tions relating to the internal management of an
agency or (b) the existence of corrupt practices.
4
Departmental regulations prescribe detailed
rules to govern the conduct of officers both on and
off duty. Personnel, for example, are typically
required to wear a prescribed uniform, to be in
possession of certain equipment, to report on and
off duty at specified times, and to follow a myriad
of general orders and standard operating proce-
dures governing the processing of police business.
In addition, an officer in his personal life is typ-
ically held to account for associating with certain
types of individuals, for becoming intoxicated,
for mismanaging his personal finances, and for
any form of sexual conduct outside of marriage.
Police administrators have traditionally as-
' The latter is generally viewed by the police as a
distinct class of wrongdoing even though corrupt
practices so often involve an abuse of police power, i.e.,
the exerting or withholding of police action in exchange
for money or other reward.
sumed a direct responsibility for assuring conform-
ity with such regulations and for ferreting out
corrupt practices. A police chief, regardless of the
size of his agency, tends to feel personally embar-
rassed when an officer is found to be sleeping on
duty, when he is found to be in the company of
known criminals, or when he is found to have ac-
cepted a bribe. In well-run police agencies, depart-
mental supervisors themselves take the initiative
in ferreting out such violations and are willing
to initiate disciplinary action. This attitude is
in sharp contrast to the lack of concern commonly
displayed with regard to the alleged abuse of
police authority.
While current public interest is not focused
upon police efforts in achieving compliance with
rules such as have been cited or with efforts to
ferret out corrupt practices, the high level of con-
formity that is accomplished in these areas sug-
gests that there may be elements in the systems
of control that are employed which are worth
adapting in efforts to establish a more effective
control over the exercise of police powers. Chief
among these appears to be the existence of a
personal commitment on the part of the police
administrator and his supervisory officers to
achieving the objective that the system of con-
trol is designed to accomplish. Where such a com-
mitment does not exist, as for example in agencies
in which supervisory officers are themselves cor-
rupt, the system fails.
2. Illegality or a Lack of Propriety? Only in a
minority of cases alleging an abuse of police powers
will evidence clearly support the fact that the
officer did exceed his authority. In the vast ma-
jority of such cases, the actions of the officer,
though they may have harshly disrupted free-
dom or privacy, are legally justified and clearly
within the scope of his police powers. What is
really at issue is the propriety of his action (a)
in terms of simple courtesy and good public rela-
tions and (b) in deciding whether he should do
what he clearly has power to do. The former of
these is easily understood. The latter is much
more complex and has become the subject of
growing attention. 5
This is reflected in the rapidly increasing body of
literature on various aspects of police discretion that
has appeared since 1960. Included among the major
works are: BANTON, THE POLICEmAN' IN THE Com-
murNiTy 127-146 (1964); LAFAVE, ARREST: T E DECI-
SIoN To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 61-161, 490-
527 (1965); SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHoUT TRIAL 71-88
(1966); Abernathy, Police Discretion and Equal Protec-
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Contrary to the common image, the police are
expected to exercise discretion in the application
of their authority. Broadly stated or ambiguous
statutes, and limitations on manpower, among
other factors, require that they do so. But due in
part to the fact that there has been a general
failure to recognize the existence of these dis-
cretionary areas, the police are rarely provided
with adequate guidelines to aid individual officers
in dealing with the infinite variety of situations
which they confront. There are, consequently,
no criteria for judging the propriety of indi-
vidual actions, and individual officers are thus left
free to function to the outer limits of their author-
ity in the handling of a given case.
Through various patterns of accommodation
and improvisation that have evolved over the
years, police officers tend to develop a reasonably
uniform sense of propriety for functioning in these
uncharted areas. After several months on the job,
a new police officer will find himself employing a
wide variety of devices for invoking less than his
full authority in disposing of numerous incidents
which come to his attention. He will, for example,
find himself ordering a disorderly group congre-
gated on the street to "move on". He will separate
combatants. He will order a child found on the
streets after curfew to go home. He will turn a
juvenile offender over to his parents. And he will
arbitrate and mediate disputes between husbands
and wives, landlords and tenants, and merchants
and their customers. In selecting from among avail-
able alternatives, including arrest, the officer
will typically consider such factors as the gravity
of the offense, the character of the individuals
involved, and their attitude in responding to his
orders or requests. Considering the informality
of the process and the fact that the criteria em-
ployed are rarely articulated, the actions taken
are surprising both in their uniformity and in their
effectiveness.
lion, 14 S.C. L. Rxv. 472 (1962); Breitel, Controls in
Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CM. L. REv. 427
(1960); Goldstein, H., Police Discretion: The Ideal
Versus the Real, 23 PuBLIc A m. Rxv. 140 (1963);
Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Crin-
inal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administra-
tion of Justice, 60 YAIx L.J. 543 (1960); Kadish, Legal
Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HAxv. L. Rv. 904 (1962); LaFave, The
Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (Parts I and II),
1962 Wis. L. REv. 104, 179; Remington, The Role of
the Police in a Democratic Society, 56 3. Cmm. L., C &
P.S. 361 (1965); Remington and Rosenblum, The
Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. IIi.
L.F. 481.
An officer may, however, employ his own per-
sonal norms in exercising discretion rather than
those which have informally developed in the
agency. This may result in his taking action which
appears unduly harsh, invasive, or costly when
related to the nature of the conduct being in-
vestigated or proceeded against. He may, for
example, arrest an elderly lady for participating
in social gambling. In the absence of adequate
guidelines, such an action would not be violative
of any law or police statement. Indeed, from the
officer's standpoint, the action may reflect a
sincere desire to conform to his personal under-
standing of the duty which he has sworn to fulfill,
even though the action would be inconsistent
with the general view of proper restraint in making
arrests. Similarly, based upon a literal interpre-
tation of the statutes, an officer may be legally
justified in searching a person, in seizing property,
or in using force in situations in which the ma-
jority of police officers, exercising what has come
to be referred to as the "common sense" of police
work, would choose not to act or would take some
lesser form of action.
Since the exercise of discretion by police officers
has generally not been acknowledged, there has
been no method established by which such discre-
tion is subjected to review or control. Existing
control mechanisms, designed to deal with those
situations in which an officer has clearly exceeded
his legal authority, have occasionally been em-
ployed to review discretionary acts, but they are
obviously not adapted to this function. Thus, for
example, a chief of police can hold an officer to
account who has gone beyond his authority in
dealing with a citizen but, short of such a violation,
he is only in a position to characterize a given
action as "improper" and urge that the officer
exercise more "common sense" in dealing with
similar situations in the future. This dilemma
suggests the need for more formalized guidance
which would also serve as the standard by which
the propriety of a given decision may be measured.
6
6 The manner in which this can best be accomplished
has been one of the principal concerns in the program of
research and training in law enforcement and criminal
justice administration being conducted at the Law
School of the University of Wisconsin under a grant
from the Ford Foundation. See Goldstein, H., Police
Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police
Performance, 65 MicH. L. REv. - (1967). A more
comprehensive analysis of the role of the police as a
policy-making agency, prepared by the author in
collaboration with Professor Frank 3. Remington, ap-
pears as Chapter 2, in the Report by the Police Task
1967]
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3. Individual Wrongdoing or Department-Wide
Practice? A review of the actions of a police officer
in a given situation may indicate that his authority
was clearly misused, but that his actions were
consistent with those taken by his fellow officers
under similar circumstances and, indeed, consistent
with the instructions or the expectations of his
superiors. This forces an awareness of the stark
fact that many routine, department-wide police
practices are without legal foundation. Police
administrators, especially in large cities, will gen-
erally acknowledge this to be the case, regretting
the existence of such practices, but asserting their
necessity for effective public protection While
the practices take on a different form from one
city to another, it would frequently be found that
police officers routinely search known gamblers;
arrest common prostitues without evidence of
their having engaged in soliciting; seize dangerous
weapons discovered by illegal search; and take
large numbers of chronic alcoholics into custody
on less than firm legal grounds.
8
The short-cutting of legal procedures often
reflects an effort on the part of the police to re-
spond to public demands that they deal with vari-
ous types of deviant behavior despite the fact
that they have encountered difficulty in at-
tempting to do so in a legal manner.' Thus, for
example, the extreme difficulty in acquiring neces-
sary evidence against an experienced prostitute
and the ineffectiveness of the monetary fine that
is typically imposed even when the necessary
evidence is acquired have often led to an unex-
pressed police policy of harassing common street
prostitutes. Police think this desirable in order to
meet public expectations; to reduce the nuisance
which streetwalking prostitutes present to unin-
volved passersby; to assist in the control of
venereal disease; and to reduce the number of
Force, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice (April, 1967).
7 See, for example, Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in
a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRu.
L., C. & P.S. 395, 398 (1960), and LAFAvE, op. cit
supra note 5, at 456 (1965).
8 The existence of each of these practices is described
in detail in LaFave, supra note 7, and in McINTYRE,
TIFFANY, AND ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (to be
published in 1967). Both volumes are based upon the
American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administra-
tion of Criminal justice in the United States. See, also,
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the
Exclusionary Ride, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 422-429 (1966).
1 For a detailed exploration of the factors that
apparently give rise to these practices, see LAFAvE, id.
at 429-455.
more serious crimes, like robbery, that are often
committed in conjunction with prostitution.
While such illegal use of police authority may not
be condoned, it must nevertheless be viewed
sympathetically as symptomatic of more complex
problems in the criminal justice system.
Most significant, from the standpoint of the
control of police behavior, is that a complaint
that cites such illegal conduct on the part of an
officer does not really raise questions regarding
individual conduct, but rather questions the in-
formal policies of the agency. Existing control
mechanisms, designed as they are to control
individual behavior, cannot adequately perform
the quite different and more complex task of
exposing and reviewing enforcement policies and
practices. This is especially true with regard to
the internal disciplinary machinery of a police
agency. However strongly committed an agency
may be to disciplining the conduct of its employees,
it is not likely to criticize the actions of an officer
which, though of questionable legality, are in
accord with a practice knowingly and consciously
engaged in by the agency. This suggests that de-
partment-wide policies, as distinct from the indi-
vidual conduct of police officers, can be adequately
controlled only from outside a police department.
FACTORS INHERENT IN TIrE NATURE OF THE POLICE
FUNCTION THAT COmPLICATE THE REvIEw
AND CONTROL OF POLICE CONDUC
While many of the problems in the control of
official conduct are common to all agencies of
government, those which are encountered in the
control of law enforcement officers are complicated
by a number of peculiarities inherent in the nature
of the police function.
1. The Adversary Nature of the Police Function.
Contacts between officers and citizens are often
initiated under conditions that are emotionally
charged-such as immediately after a fight, a
disturbance, or the commission of a crime of
passion. Any action on the part of an officer, in
restraining the parties or in effecting an arrest,
serves to raise the emotions of those involved
to a still higher pitch. The exchange of words in
so highly charged an atmosphere often leads to
physical reactions-with each verbal or physical
act by the citizen and the officer countered by a
stronger reaction-frequently escalating to the
point that force is applied. 10
1 In an effort to avoid such situations, the Chicago
[Vol. 58
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A review of this kind of incident involves the
difficult task of weighing whether the provoca-
tions warranted the reactions which they elicited.
The task is most delicate when the allegation is
one of verbal abuse and the review necessarily
consists of weighing the choice of words on the
part of each party and the tone in which they were
expressed.
A somewhat different set of problems is created
by the fact that the hard core of criminal offenders
against whom the police must take action do not
have the least hesitation to make a false allega-
tion regarding police conduct if there is the
slightest possibility that such an allegation will
benefit their situation by clouding the issue of
their own guilt. Such individuals may also file
a false allegation as a means for "getting back at"
the police officer whose actions resulted in their
being arrested and charged with a crime. Persons
engaged in organized crime and the operators of
disreputable establishments that are subject to
police regulation are among those who make use
of this technique as a means of harassing arresting
or investigating officers.
The frequency with which such allegations are
made and the degree to which they are established
to be unfounded leads to a tendency on the part
of police supervisors to discredit all complaints
of persons frequently engaged in criminal activity
or subject to strict police regulation. Among the
obvious dangers in adopting such a posture is the
fact that the most common and most difficult of-
fender is among those who are especially vulnerable
to the abuse of police authority. An officer may
conclude that an offender's reputation is such
that his word would not be trusted in a subse-
quent review. This tendency requires that com-
plaints filed by persons with the poorest of repu-
tations be investigated with the greatest of care.
2. The Isolated Conditions Under Which the
Police Function. Review of a citizen's relationship
with a police officer is often complicated by the
isolated conditions under which the two parties
come in contact with each other. By the very
nature of the police function, a person spotted
alone in certain areas of a community becomes the
subject of police attention. His isolation from
others is one of the factors contributing to his
Police Department has defined the "professional"
police officer as one who "does not allow himself to be
personally offended or to become emotionally involved
in any controversy." Chicago Police Department, On
This We Stand 17 (1966).
being considered suspect. Thus, police are under-
standably attracted to individuals found during
the early hours of the morning walking in com-
mercial areas, loitering in alleys, or lounging about
other locations normally devoid of persons during
such hours. The absence of witnesses to such con-
tacts makes it difficult to reconstruct the relation-
ship, should some aspect of it subsequently be
subject to question.
This same factor contributes to the difficulties
experienced in supervising and directing police
actions on a continuing basis. It is possible-and,
in fact, relatively easy-to hold large numbers of
police officers to a given form of conduct when they
are functioning together in a group under the
direct eyes of several echelons of supervisors and
large numbers of citizens. Such is the case, for
example, when police are assigned to the handling
of a demonstration. But it is a far more complex
task to elicit conformance with established stand-
ards of conduct when one or two officers are
functioning on their own in the nooks and crannies
of a built-up and highly congested urban area.
The only effective form of control, under such con-
ditions, is an ingrained desire on the part of the
officers to want to act properly.
3. The Defensive Posture of the Police. The per-
sons most likely to witness police actions are other
police officers. But, when such actions are chal-
lenged, the fraternal spirit that binds all law
enforcement officers usually results in the wit-
nesses supporting the position of the accused
officer, whatever his position may be, or results
in their claiming a lack of sufficient knowledge.1'
This attitude understandably grows out of the
defensive posture which the police have tradi-
tionally assumed in this country. Police officers
share a common concern over the possibility
that they will be killed or injured, that they will
be subject to false accusations, or that they will
be deprived of the benefits to which they are en-
titled in their jobs. The resulting solidarity is
reinforced by shared experiences in reacting to
frequent public criticism of police functioning-
criticism which often cites shortcomings that
result from factors over which the police, them-
selves, have little control.
Because of the defensive posture which they
1 In fairness, it must be recognized that the tendency
on the part of police officers to close ranks in defense of
a fellow officer is a characteristic common to many
other fields of endeavor, e.g., the notorious difficulty in
establishing malpractice in the medical field.
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assume, the police fail to distinguish allegations
of individual wrongdoing from a broader form of
criticism of police conduct. The individual allega-
tion, as a result, elicits the same kind of unified
defense as any of the other factors that serve to
bind officers together. As a result, an almost in-
flexible code develops that prevents any officer
from testifying as to the actions of another that
might be considered improper or illegal. The im-
plications which this "conspiracy of silence"
has for the control and review of police conduct
are obvious.
4. Conflicting Demands on the Police Executive.
2
Police efforts devoted to preventing crime consist
of actively ferreting out and investigating sus-
picious circumstances and people. Because of the
emphasis placed on prevention, the average officer
is under considerable pressure from his superiors
to be energetic in carrying out this function.
He is urged to patrol intensively the areas to which
he is assigned-to probe, to search, and to ex-
plore, in an effort to identify any situation or
circumstance that suggests a crime is likely to be
committed. He is told that an officer who conceives
his function to be solely that of responding to
calls for police assistance is not performing well
as a police officer. A variety of administrative
devices are employed to implement this concept,
all of which place a high value, in the form of
rewards and prestige, upon positive results. Thus,
for example, an officer is likely to receive a special
commendation for having apprehended, as a result
of his patrol efforts, a person about to commit a
burglary.
The difficulties in this area grow out of the fact
that individual officers are left to define the limits
of their preventive activities. Some seem capable
of satisfying the need for active patrol by dis-
creetly inquiring into the circumstances and indi-
viduals that arouse their suspicions. Others,
however, investigate and question aggressively,
thereby offending in varying degrees the indi-
viduals with whom they come in contact. A police
chief who feels that the effectiveness of his pre-
ventive efforts is dependent upon the degree to
which he can motivate his men to be vigorous in
their patrol activities is hard-put to review a com-
plaint alleging overly-aggressive behavior.
A second and somewhat similar conflict is
12 Each of the superior officers at the various echelons
of supervision in a police agency experience the same
conflicts in somewhat varying form.
posed by what is viewed by some as the com-
petitive nature of the police function. The public
tends to define police operations in detecting
crime and identifying criminals as a battle of
wits between the "good guys" and the "bad guys".
Efforts to deal more effectively with the crime
problem are characterized as a "war" on crime.
Police officials and individual police officers, mo-
tivated by a desire to fulfill a "winning" image,
take up this cudgel. In large cities, the police
themselves sporadically declare "war" against
streetwalking prostitutes, bars in which homo-
sexuals congregate, or honky-tonks in which bar
girls solicit for drinks and in which prostitution
thrives.
When the lines are drawn in this manner, it
becomes especially difficult for the police adminis-
trator to hold his men to the rules of the game.
The competitive atmosphere that is created sug-
gests, at times, that the offender must be appre-
hended and prosecuted at any cost. The more
despicable the offender or the nature of his of-
fense, the more difficult it becomes to exercise
restraints. Thus, for example, residents of a com-
munity terrorized by a serious murder, by the
strangling of a series of women, or by the rape of a
child will urge that no stone be left unturned in
the search for the offender. Such pressures are
taken by individual police officers as a mandate to
employ techniques which they might otherwise not
employ in attempting to identify and apprehend
the offender. Appalling as such offenses may be,
and desirous as a chief of police may be to solve
them, it often becomes his task to remind the com-
munity of the limitations of police authority and
to remind his subordinates that the constitutional
safeguards that guarantee due process were es-
pecially designed to guard against such "lynch-
like" pressures; that it is under just such conditions
that these safeguards receive their supreme test.
A weak chief succumbs to the pressures together
with his men.
There exists still a third kind of conflict which
the police administrator must resolve. As a leader
of a body of men, the chief must behave in a man-
ner which elicits the support of his subordinates
and which results in their performing in accordance
with his instructions. Maintaining a high level of
motivation in a police operation is an especially
difficult task because so much of what an officer
does is frustrating, routine, and endless.
Like all employees-and especially those en-
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gaged in a military or semimilitary organization-
police officers are most likely to respond positively
to a leader who, by his actions, demonstrates
that he is prepared to support them in handling
the most difficult aspects of their work. Desired
support may, for example, take the form of being
physically present at the scene of a riot or a serious
crime when an especially difficult challenge has
been presented to the agency. But, of the several
types of support, subordinates attach the greatest
importance to a chief's willingness to defend his
men against public criticism. This does not present
a problem when the administrator agrees that the
actions criticized were both legal and appropriate
under the circumstances. The conflicting pressures
arise when the actions of the officer were dearly
illegal or ill-advised.
Chiefs respond to this kind of a situation in dif-
ferent ways. There are those who place a higher
value on maintaining a good relationship with their
subordinates than upon being responsive to well-
founded public criticism. Such chiefs are prepared
to defend the actions of their officers, however
illegal or improper they may have been; or they
are, as a minimum, prepared to resolve all ques-
tionable cases in favor of their personnel. The chief
who attempts to balance, in a judicious manner,
the interests of his men with the public's interest
undertakes the more difficult chore, for he must be
prepared to incur the wrath of either his subor-
dinates or his public or both in borderline cases.
His conclusions may lead to his punishing an
officer who, in the eyes of his fellow officers, acted
heroically. Or he may, upon weighing the evidence,
find it necessary to dismiss charges against an
officer who appears, in the minds of the public,
to be dearly guilty of the alleged charge. In ful-
filling this delicate role, a police administrator
becomes aware of the fact that an officer wrong-
fully accused of an illegal or improper action is
himself subject to "lynch-type" pressures and, as
such, experiences all of the problems of the most
unpopular of defendants in a criminal case.
5. Limitations Inherent in the Complaint Process.
Practically all forms of control over police be-
havior depend heavily upon the filing of com-
plaints by aggrieved citizens. Some police agencies
have undertaken on their own initiative to test the
conformity of their personnel with established
operating procedures, and some have experimented
with various techniques for checking on the in-
tegrity of their personnel. But such techniques
have generally not been employed to uncover the
misuse of police authority."3
Failure to take the initiative in seeking out
abuses is not so much a reflection of a lack of in-
terest as it is a reflection of a hesitancy to make
use of the kind of techniques which would be re-
quired. The few police administrators who have
employed persons to pose as prisoners, or have
otherwise created an opportunity for an allegedly
abusive officer to act under conditions which would
provide evidence of his abuse, have been severely
castigated by the public and especially by police
organizations representing rank and file interests.
The complaint process itself, upon which major
dependence is placed, has many shortcomings.
It is not a valid measurement of misconduct,
nor is it an effective means of assuring that all
abuses of police authority are brought to official
attention. Individuals most subject to abuse are
those with the least competence and the least
standing to complain. Ghetto residents, for ex-
ample, are generally unaware of how one goes
about challenging the exercise of authority. Many
lack an understanding of the limitations on police
powers. But even if they are aware that a given
action was illegal and they are made familiar
with the processes by which complaints may be
filed, aggrieved parties may choose not to file a
complaint. Persons residing in such areas are
fearful of possible reprisal. They fear that their
future conduct might be subject to special scrutiny.
And they fear endangering a relationship with the
police which they depend upon should the need
for a variety of emergency services arise. Even
when mechanisms are established to facilitate
the filing of grievances, the percentage of com-
plaints arising from ghetto areas is small in rela-
tion to the density of population and the prob-
ability that abuses occur."'
Similarly, persons continually engaged in crim-
inal activity, such as a narcotic addict or a street
prostitute, fear retaliation. Others such as homo-
sexuals or the customers of prostitutes, refrain
from complaining about questionable police ac-
tions because of the embarrassment that a full
revelation is likely to cause them.
It is in the nature of a complaint process that
13 Investigative efforts designed to uncover corrupt
practices (which practices usually involve an abuse of
police powers) are an exception.
14 For a description of the New York City experience
in this regard under its short-lived, civilian-dominated




positive action is required of the complainant.
He must seek out the procedure by which corn
plaints are to be filed. He must identify himself
and provide sufficient information to enable the
initiation of an investigation. He must be pre-
pared to assist in the investigation, to identify
alleged wrongdoers, and to participate in any
formal disciplinary proceeding or any criminal
prosecution which may result. Involvement be-
comes costly in terms of time, travel, and days
lost from work. A common awareness of the in-
convenience one is caused and the degree to which
one is placed in an accusatory position serves as
a major deterrent. Yet, all of these processes are
essential in order to weed out the large percentage
of unjustified complaints that are filed and to
protect an officer from false accusations.
Limitations inherent in the adversary nature of
the complaint process as it has been employed
have recently led to the suggestion that citizens'
complaints be viewed primarily as a means for
identifying and improving areas of police func-
tioning in need of correction-rather than as a
means for initiating an action against an indi-
vidual police officer. 5
INADEQUACIES IN EXISTING AND PROPOSED
METRODS OF EXTERNAL CONTROL
When one considers the most commonly cited
mechanisms for the control of police behavior
from outside a police agency as they relate to the
problems that have been discussed, their value,
limitations, and inadequacies become more dearly
apparent.
1. Civil Action. 16 The instituting of a civil
action against a police officer is perhaps least
satisfactory, both as a means of seeking redress
and as a means for positively influencing police
conduct. Because it is a complex process requiring
the assistance of counsel, the cost involved makes
it unavailable to the vast majority of persons
who have a basis for complaint. Juries are not
likely to have compassion for a plaintiff, however
abused, if he is guilty of a crime or is disreputable.
Most police officers and police administrators
view a civil action as an attack from "outside" that
must be defended at any cost. Counsel is usually
assigned to officers named in a suit, however inde-
15 GELLEOQN, WHEN AMERIcANs CoMPI.AiN 184-195
(1966).
16 For a detailed examination of the problems and
issues in the bringing of civil actions against police
officers, see Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
fensible the action of the officers may have been."
Attorneys on a city's legal staff who are regularly
assigned to defending such actions, or who are re-
tained for the purpose, generally view their func-
tion as being limited to providing the best defense
for the individual officer. They do not conceive it
to be their role, even when it is established that the
officer was at fault, to suggest a reevaluation of
the departmental practices that appear to have
given rise to the officer's actions in the particular
case. If such an effort were made, the time required
for processing a civil action would most likely di-
vorce the impact of the finding from the practices
to which it relates.
A civil action may interfere with administrative
efforts to control police conduct. The filing of a suit
in some jurisdictions results in the suspension of
any form of internal disciplinary action because it
is feared that such action may prejudice the pend-
ing litigation.
2. Judicial Review. The enforcement of the
various exclusionary rules required by constitu-
tional interpretation or court policy places all trial
judges very explicitly in the role of controlling
police practices. Judicial control is, however,
limited to the review of only those aspects of police
functioning that relate to acquiring evidence in
cases in which there is an intention to initiate a
prosecution. Such cases represent but a very small
segment of the total number of actions in which the
police are typically engaged. For every incident in
which a police officer exerts his authority as the
first step in a process leading to a prosecution, he
handles a multitude of other incidents in which he
checks out suspicious circumstances, separates
combatants, orders people to disperse, or in some
other manner uses his powers without effecting an
arrest.18 And even if an arrest is made, it is not al-
ways indicative of a desire to prosecute. In many
cases it is intended only to serve some other more
short-lived objective, such as the harassment of
prostitutes or the safeguarding of drunks."
In those cases in which the legality of police per-
7 The practice may stem from a desire on the part of
a municipality, as an employer, to "back up" its
employees in the discharge of their duties. An added
factor, in some jurisdictions, however, may be the
possibility of a municipality's incurring some financial
obligation. In Illinois, for example, municipalities are
required to indemnify policemen for judgments rendered
against them for injury negligently caused in the
performance of their duties. ILL. REv. STAT., Ch. 24,
§1-4-5 (1965). The desire to keep a city's financial
burden as low as possible motivates a municipality to
assure adequate counsel.
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formance is questioned by introduction of a motion
to suppress evidence, rulings are made in a manner
which serves neither to influence the future be-
havior of the officer nor to influence the policies
and practices of the police agency. Judges seem
content to consider each motion to suppress as a
review of the conduct of individual officers, even
when the officer's conduct appears to be consistent
with departmental practices. Not only are the
broaderproblems not addressed, but the suppression
of evidence has no effect upon the behavior of the
individual officer. Given the choice, the officer is
likely to conform to the expectations of his most
immediate superiors rather than of the courts.
Should the individual officer desire to adhere to
judicial requirements, he would often find it
difficult to do so. Motions to suppress are fre-
quently granted without an adequate explanation
to the officer as to the reasons why his actions in
acquiring evidence were considered illegal. Sec-
ondly, the absence of uniformity among the views
of judges sitting in the multiple courts of large
cities results in subjecting the individual officer to
conflicting instructions.
It is possible and certainly desirable to modify
the current system of judicial review so as to in-
crease its effectiveness and to make it a construc-
tive instrument for the improvement of police
functioning. To accomplish this will require a
number of basic changes in judicial practice and an
ability and willingness of a police administrator to
devise means for assuring the conformity of his
personnel.20
3. Civilian Review Boards. Most of the recent
18Banton argues that a patrol officer is primarily a
"peace officer" rather than a "law officer"; that far
more of his time is spent in keeping the peace by super-
vising his beat and responding to requests for assistance
than is spent in enforcing the law in the sense of
arresting offenders. BANTON, THE PoLIcE AND THE
ComtmNi-y 1-85 (1964).
For an illustration of the manner in which a police
officer assigned to a congested area of a large city spends
his time, see A Report by the Police Task Force, Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, Chapter 2, (April, 1967).
19 See, in particular, the discussion of arrests for
purposes other than prosecution in LAFAVE, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 437-489 (1965).
20 Specific proposals for strengthening the existing
system of judicial control are made in LaFave and
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Jvdge's Role in
Making and Reviewing Law Enforcenent Decisions, 63
MicH. L. REv. 987 (1965); LaFave, op. cit. supra note 8,
(pts. 1-2), 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 566 (1966); and A Re-
port by the Police Task Force, President's Connnission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Chapter 2, (April, 1967).
efforts to establish civilian review boards have been
intended primarily to provide citizens-and espe-
cially those members of minority groups residing
within ghetto areas-an opportunity to air their
grievances regarding the exercise of police au-
thority. The several boards that have actually
been established are without power to control
police behavior. They are authorized to receive
complaints, to hold hearings, and, as their conclud-
ing action, to advise police authorities on the form
of disciplinary action, if any, that ought to be
taken.2 The boards are no better equipped than
are police chiefs to initiate action against what ap-
pears to be improper-but legally authorized-
police actions. Nor are they expected to initiate
inquiries into the policies and practices of a police
agency. Their primary orientation is toward the
review of individual wrongdoing, and their in-
fluence upon police behavior not specifically sub-
ject to their review appears limited to the deterrent
effect which their existence creates.
Grievance procedures, in themselves, are of
major importance. It is essential that citizens be
provided with easily accessible means for ex-
pressing their concern over an alleged abuse of
governmental power. It is especially important, in
the interests of fairness and equality of treatment,
that such means be made available to the least
articulate segment of the community whose mem-
bers are most often subject to police action. The
essential nature of this need is underlined by recog-
nizing that the frustrations resulting from unaired
complaints and grievances against the police and
other agencies of government are among the fac-
tors generally viewed as contributing to the kind of
violence that has recently erupted in several of the
country's largest urban areas.
Important as they are, however, it must be
recognized that grievance procedures that air
complaints against individual police officers serve
a limited function. The broader objective must re-
main that of correcting or eliminating the situa-
tions that give rise to such complaints. Progress
21 For a succinct description of the development and
experience of existing civilian review boards, see
GELLEOQN, WHEN AiRxicAus ComzPAm 170-195
(1966). See also Beral and Sisk, The Administration of
Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARv. L
RzLv. 499, 511-519 (1964).
For a discussion of some of the arguments for and
against such boards, see Inbau, Democratic Restraints
Upon the Police, 57 J. GClu. L., C. & P. S. 265, 269
(1966) and Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest
of Us, 57 J. CaRn. L., C. & P. S. 238, 241 (1966).
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toward this goal, in the long run, is dependent
upon the development of more effective means for
controlling police conduct. This suggests, as a very
minimum, that grievance machinery be con-
structed with an appropriate concern for the man-
ner in which it affects control mechanisms. The
complaint process ought to support and reinforce
the system of internal discipline upon which pri-
mary dependence is placed for the control of police
conduct.
While the point has not been made explicitly, it
has been argued that civilian review boards would
have the opposite effect.2 Because of the adversary
relationship between the complainant and the
accused police officer to which the existence of such
a board would give emphasis, it is claimed that
whatever force or commitment may have de-
veloped within a police agency for self-discipline
would be abandoned in the face of a more com-
pelling desire on the part of police personnel to
support a brother officer who stands accused before
such a board.
4. The Ombudsman Concept. Stimulated by the
current wave of interest in the control of police
conduct, increased support appears to be develop-
ing for adopting the ombudsman concept-so well
established in the Scandinavian countries and in
New Zealand-as a form of control over the full
range of governmental functions in the United
States.n
The concept has much to be said in its favor as a
means for airing grievances, for controlling official
conduct, and, at the same time, for improving the
effectiveness and fairness of administrative opera-
tions. Among its features is the fact that the om-
budsman achieves his control through the support
and reinforcement of internal systems of discipline.
2 See, for example, IACP Position Statement on
Police Revieaw Boards, Tir PoLIcE CHrF, June 1965,
pp. 8-9, and the Statement of Police Commissioner
Vincent L. Broderick, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1966, p. 1,
col. 1; p. 30, cols. 4, 5 (city ed.) More specific reference
is made to this point in a policy statement of the
Chicago Police Department, in which it is claimed that
the existence of a civilian review board "would not
improve discipline but would in fact tend to lower the
disciplinary level because an adversary rather than a
straight fact finding system would be created and
investigating officers and other officers called as wit-
nesses would tend to shield a brother officer from the
board. All progress that has been made toward penetrat-
ing this 'blue curtain' would be lost." Chicago Police
Department, On This We Stand 17 (1966).
2 For the most comprehensive treatment of the
ombudsman concept, see GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND
OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN INME COUNTRIES
(1966).
When he has a basis for criticism, the criticism is
typically directed at the head of an agency, who is
held responsible for the performance of his subordi-
nates, rather than against individual employees.
4
Agency heads are expected to investigate allega-
tions of wrongdoing and to take appropriate ac-
tion. The ombudsman becomes involved only when
he has reason to believe that a complaint alleging
wrongdoing has been inadequately dealt with by
administrative officials or when he believes that the
policies and practices to which a complaint relates
ought to be subject to review and possibly to
modification.
There are a number of other features in the
ombudsman concept that have special value when
related to the problems encountered in the control
of police conduct. The mere presence of a detached,
independent critic would serve, in a very important
way, to support a police administrator desirous of
making the right choice when confronted with
strong pressures that move him in the other direc-
tion. Application of this form of control to all
agencies of government would lessen the defensive
posture which police assume when singled out from
among other agencies for special scrutiny. And the
transfer in emphasis from exclusively negative
criticism-in the form of recommendations for
disciplinary action or in the form of dismissal of
criminal charges because of the way in which evi-
dence was acquired-to constructive suggestions
for change and improvement would afford the
opportunity for making the complaint process
serve as an effective method for strengthening ad-
ministration.
Left unsettled, however, is the application of the
ombudsman concept to police functioning which is
of a discretionary nature. The fact that an om-
budsman is limited in his review of the discretion-
ary acts of administrative officials is recognized
in the several countries in which the institution
now exists.25 This limitation would loom as a much
more serious problem if the concept were applied
to police activities in this country, for vast areas
of police functioning currently involve the exercise
of discretion. The complexity of our society gives
rise to a far greater number and variety of situa-
2 This is in sharp contrast with current practice in
this country in which it is an exception for supervisory
officers to be disciplined for the wrongdoing of their
subordinates.
25 See, for example, Hunwrz, THE OMBUSDMAN 8
(1962). See, also, the discussion of an external review of
discretionary judgments in GELLuORN, WHEN AsrER-
ICANS COMPLAIN 221 (1966).
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tions to which basic legislative provisions do not
apply. Complicating the situation is the fact that
the propriety of police exercising any discretion is
very much at issue, there being no formal recogni-
tion of their authority to do so.
Meaningful review by an ombudsman of situa-
tions involving the exercise of discretion by the
police would require, as a prerequisite, legislative
acknowledgment of the need for the police to em-
ploy discretion within broad legislative bounds.26
Subsequently, it would become necessary for the
legislature and administrative agencies to share in
the development of criteria for decision-making
that would provide guidelines for operating per-
sonnel and that would constitute a basis for the
desired review and control of police conduct.2
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Recent efforts to control police behavior from
outside a police agency have been characterized by
a desire to realize rapid results-stimulated by an
awareness of the lack of progress that has been
made in this area over the years and by the recent
surge of interest in equalizing the protection
afforded individual rights. Such efforts have not
had the benefit of extensive prior research, nor has
there been a systematic attempt to accumulate
the experiences of those who have, in varying de-
grees, been in some way involved in the broad
function of controlling police behavior. Familiarity
with police operations suggests that there are sev-
eral working hypotheses that should be subject to
further exploration and study.
The nature of the police function is such that
primary dependence for the control of police con-
duct must continue to be placed upon internal
systems of control-upon the traditional system of
organization by which an administrator and his
superior are held strictly and continually account-
able for the performance of their subordinates.
There is considerable potential for realizing im-
proved control over the exercise of police authority
by adapting administrative procedures now com-
monly employed in achieving other forms of
internal discipline. The primary requisite is a
26It is conceivable that an ombudsman could
function effectively in reviewing discretionary judg-
ments without specific legislative acknowledgment of
the propriety of police exercising discretion, but this
would require that he, himself, assume the position that
the exercise of discretion by the police is appropriate
and that he be prepared to assert this view when faced
with questions relating to discretionary actions.
27 See supra note 6.
stronger commitment on the part of police adminis-
trators to this goal-a commitment which may
often conflict with the most immediate objectives
of arrest and prosecution. A strongly committed
police chief, however, is not likely to achieve total
effectiveness on his own because of the isolated
conditions under which individual officers nor-
mally function. An added requirement-and the
most difficult of realization-is the development of
a form of self-discipline and personal commitment
on the part of individual police officers that sub-
verts the predominant concern for efficiency to an
overriding concern for the fairness of his actions.
Since training affords the opportunity for institu-
tionalizing values and norms, the need for develop-
ment of such a commitment should constitute a
major challenge for existing and newly established
police training programs.
External controls over police conduct are essen-
tial under our form of government, and it is im-
portant that police join in a recognition of their
value and purpose. Citizens dissatisfied with the
manner in which a complaint is handled ought to
have the opportunity for an independent review.
An effective means ought to be available for ques-
tioning agency-wide practices and policies. And an
external critic ought to be available to protect and
support a police administrator against contrary
pressures in his efforts to attain proper goals.n But
external controls should be designed in a manner
that reinforces the internal systems of discipline
upon which primary dependence continues to be
28 A new program, proposed by a group in Chicago,
and referred to as "Citizens Alert", attempts to achieve
some of these objectives. It establishes procedures for
aiding the residents of depressed neighborhoods in
filing complaints where there is evidence of significant
police misconduct. In setting forth their objectives,
the sponsors of the project acknowledge the difficulties
of police work in such areas and state: "We have a
superintendent of police in Chicago who seems to be
quite anxious to eliminate poor police practices and
raise the quality of his force. However, he has tre-
mendous problems of morale and is himself constantly
faced with the 'blue curtain,' i.e., the protective shield
which policemen interpose against inquiry by anyone
who did not himself rise through the ranks. At least in
part, Citizens Alert could assist the Department by
creating outside pressures which will give the super-
intendent greater freedom to act against unprofessional
police conduct." Among the alternative methods listed
for handling of cases is a referral to the police depart-
ment's internal investigation division (IID). The pur-
pose of such referral, as indicated in the proposal for the
project, is "to continue to test the effetiveness of the
lID and to constantly give them an opportunity to
demonstrate good faith in their procedures." Prospectus
for The Chicago Metropolitan Area Citizens Alert
(mimeo.), January, 1967.
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placed. They should not be oriented toward the
control of individual misconduct, but rather should
be directed at a review of the conditions that make
such misconduct possible.
Whether one is concerned with the effectiveness
of internal or external controls, the currently wide
gap between the law and practice must in some
manner be narrowed if there is to be a basis for
review. The propriety of police exercising discre-
tion must be formally recognized and a means de-
signed that will serve to systematize decision-
making in these discretionary areas; that will
provide guidelines for operating personnel; and
that will provide a basis for the desired review and
control.
Pervading all of these considerations is the need
for reducing the factors that contribute to the com-
plexity of controling police conduct. Chief among
these are the extremes that exist in the range of
pressures brought to bear upon the police by the
various segments of the public with which they
must deal. At one end are those who have the ca-
pacity to exert considerable pressure, often result-
ing in the police responding by employing prac-
tices that are illegal or at least questionable. At
the other end of the range are those who, lacking
status, tolerate police conduct that is clearly im-
proper.
The police administrator having a professional
commitment to eliciting conformity on the part of
his personnel to standards of fairness as well as
effectiveness will recognize the desirability of his
initiating steps to create a better balance in the
pressures exerted on his department. He must
seize every opportunity that presents itself to
familiarize those who exert unreasonable pressures
on a police agency with the limitations that exist
on the exercise of police powers. At the same time,
he must assist in developing the capacity of all
citizens-and especially minority groups-to exert
their rightful demands for a high quality of police
service. The existence of a more uniform public
demand for policing that reflects an awareness of
the unique role of the police in a democratic society
would serve to reduce the factors that presently
complicate the control of police conduct. It would
also serve to lend needed support to the kind of
professional commitment to fairness as well as
effectiveness that is so basic a requirement for those
having administrative responsibilities in the police
field.
2 It is for this reason that current efforts on the part
of the police to develop programs aimed at improving
police-community relations are especially significant.
What is called for, however, goes far beyond some of
the existing programs which are limited in their objec-
tive to improving communication with minority groups
or, most narrowly defined, to improving the com-
munity's image of its police force and its understanding
of police problems. The programs having the greatest
potential are those which seek to bring about the kind
of involvement on the part of the police that will result
in their working closely with citizens, citizen groups,
and various community resources in identifying and
attempting to solve some of the communitywide
problems that give rise to crime, to individual hardships,
and to community tensions.
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